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Products Designed for Illegal Use-A
Proposed Rule for Product Suppliers who
Profit from Illegal Activity
George A. Nation, III*
Glen Smith gets into his car and, along with the normal activity
associated with starting the automobile, flips an additional switch.
He has just turned on his Protector radar detection device.' Mr.
Smith merges onto the Pennsylvania Turnpike where the traffic is
moderate; Mr. Smith, thanks to his radar detector, is confident there
is no police radar ahead. One glance in the rear view mirror and he
is convinced he can exceed the speed limit with no danger of being
caught.' He accelerates to 80 miles per hour. Mr. Smith crests a
slight rise in the road and encounters a vehicle in his lane that has
slowed - he applies the brakes but cannot stop in time and slams
into the back of the station wagon carrying a family of four.
One morning last October as officer Ben Jones of the New York
Police Department left for work, Mrs. Jones kissed him goodbye.
She worries every day, like every other spouse or family member of a
police officer, about her husband and the dangers he faces on the job.
She feels somewhat reassured since he began wearing the bullet
proof vest she bought for him. Each morning as she kisses him good-
* Assistant Professor of Law and Business, Lehigh University, B.S. 1980, J.D. 1983,
Villanova University.
I. A radar detector is a small device that alerts a driver to the presence of police radar
by emitting a series of beeping sounds or flashing lights whenever police radar is detected. This
in turn allows the speeding driver to slow down before he gets to the police radar, thereby
avoiding any penalty for violating the speed limit. When the warning signal stops, the driver is
assured that no radar is nearby and he can again exceed the speed limit. Since 1968 when
radar detectors were invented, there has developed a $275,000,000 per year market in radar
detectors. Rogers, Speed Bumps Ahead for Cincinnati Microwave, FORTUNE, April 28, 1986
at 84 (quoting Seth Feinstein, an industry consultant). The market is still growing; one article
noted that while radar detectors were "once an obscure gadget found mostly on the dashboards
of high-performance cars or in the cabs of long haul trucks," they are now "becoming standard
operating equipment on workaday Chevys, Fords and Toyotas." Castro, Speeder's Friend,
Smokey's Foe, TIME, July 7, 1986 at 46. Castro notes that "1.5 million citizens bought so-
called Smokey detectors last year, a 25 percent increase over 1984." Id. Radar detectors are
legal in every state except Connecticut, Virginia and the District of Columbia. Moreover, the
legality of statutes which bar radar detectors has been challenged based on the asserted right
of free access to radar frequencies. Id.
2. Consumers buy radar detectors because the detectors allow them to exceed the legal
speed limit with a greatly reduced risk of being caught. Arguably, if consumers did not have
the detector they would be less likely to speed. See infra note 31.
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bye, she feels for the vest to make sure he is wearing it. At 11:00
A.M. on that October day, Officer Jones responded to a call regard-
ing a disturbance at an abandoned warehouse. As he entered the
cocaine lab one of the occupants shot him - Officer Jones, hit in the
chest, was later pronounced dead at the scene. When the lieutenant
called Mrs. Jones, he explained, in response to her question, that
there was nothing wrong with the vest; it was just no match for the
Devestator bullets that had been fired at her husband. The lieuten-
ant explained that such bullets are coated with a teflonlike material
and as a result make conventional bullet proof vests worthless.
John Brown, the owner of a sporting goods store in a large city,
discussed carrying a new line of handguns commonly known as "Sat-
urday Night Specials" with the manufacturer's salesman. The sales-
man showed Mr. Brown their most popular model, a two and one
half inch pistol, and said, "The suggested wholesale price, your cost,
is $21.80, the suggested retail price is $30.50 so you can do pretty
well on these." The salesman went on to say: "If your store is any-
where near a ghetto area these ought to sell real well. This is most
assuredly a ghetto gun - it sells real well but, between you and me,
its such a piece of crap, I'd be afraid to fire the thing or count on
hitting anything that is more than four feet away."" Mr. Brown de-
cided to stock the handguns. The salesman was right; they sold very
well.8
Joe White needed money, at least a few hundred dollars. He
thought about robbing the 7-11 convenience store but wondered how
he could do it and get away. If he had a gun, a pistol he could hide
in his pocket, he felt sure he could get in, point the gun, demand the
money, get it and get out without "anyone trying nothing." He
3. "Saturday Night Special" handguns are characterized as being small, easily conceal-
able, inexpensive, inaccurate and poorly made. Thus, they are not useful for any legitimate
purpose such as hunting, target shooting, law enforcement or self protection. The only use for
Saturday Night Special handguns is illegal activity. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 497
A.2d 1143 (1985).
4. These comments appear in the context of a hypothetical conversation. Substantially
the same comments, however, were made by an actual salesman for the largest United States
manufacturer of Saturday Night Special handguns. See Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal)
in Guns, HARPERS, Sept. 1977 at 37, 40.
5. It is very difficult to obtain accurate data concerning the production and sale of hand-
guns. See Brill, supra note 4. A salesman for R.G. Industries, the largest manufacturer of
Saturday Night Special handguns, is quoted as saying that 190,000 of just one model (RG
fourteen) Saturday Night Special handgun were sold in 1976. Id. at 40.
6. Given a Saturday Night Specials' characteristics, it is easy to understand why it is the
weapon of choice of criminals. Because of its small size, a Saturday Night Special is very easy
to conceal. In addition, a Saturday Night Special is inexpensive and easy to dispose of. The
metal used to construct Saturday Night Specials is often so soft that serial numbers are easily
obliterated and ballistics characteristics change each time the gun is fired. No sportsmen
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bought one of John Brown's Saturday Night Specials. Mr. White
walked into the 7-11 and up to the cashier, pointed the gun and
demanded the money in the cash register. At that moment someone
walked in the store and Mr. White panicked, pointed the gun and at
point blank range, pulled the trigger. He then turned and fired
again. Max Thomas, the person entering the store, was pronounced
dead at the scene and the employee at the cash register was rushed
to the hospital.7
I. Introduction
In the reckless pursuit of money, certain product manufacturers
are producing "criminal products," that is products that are
designed to be used in illegal and often criminal activity.8 This term
does not refer to products that have significant legitimate uses but
which are occasionally used, or misused, in illegal activity.' This ar-
ticle focuses exclusively on products whose objectively intended use
is illegal activity. 10 Saturday Night Special handguns, devestator
would use a Saturday Night Special because it is too inaccurate, but to a criminal robbing
someone at point blank range, accuracy is not necessary. See infra notes 9-10 and accompany-
ing text.
7. Every thirteen seconds a new handgun is sold in this country; every two and a half
minutes the product injures someone and three times every hour it is an instrument of death.
Turley and Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAMLINE L. REv. 285,
285 (1983). See Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Injuries From a Well-Made Hand-
gun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467, 470 n. 17 (1983) (authored by Gerard Mackarevich)
[hereinafter Well-Made Handguns]. See also Darts and Laurels, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Jan-Feb., 1982 at 22 (citing an investigative series in Cox Newspapers, Sept. 6-11, 1981)
(giving statistical evidence of disproportionate criminal use of short-range, inaccurate hand-
guns labeled "snubbies" because of their short barrels, such handguns are also referred to as
"belly guns"). But see Brill, supra note 4, at 37 (arguing that the cheap handguns are not, in
fact, used more often than more expensive handguns in crime).
8. Examples of products designed for use in criminal activity include: Saturday Night
Special Handguns, see Kelley, 304 Md. at 145, 146, 794 A.2d at 153-54; Radar Detectors, See
Rogers, supra note I; and Devestator Bullets (bullets coated with a teflonlike material which
enables them to penetrate conventional bullet proof vests). Because of their nature and design
these products have no utility; they are only useful in illegal activity. See Note, Manufactur-
ers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV.
771, at 772, 790-91 (1983) (authored by H. Todd Iveson) (hereinafter Common Law Ap-
proach]; Turley and Harrison, supra note 7 at 285.
James Jeager, chairman of Cincinnati Microwave, a leading producer of radar detectors,
does "not deny that customers use his product to break the law." See Rogers, supra note I at
84. American Antenna of Elgin, Illinois, another producer of radar detectors, guarantees that
customers using its K40 radar detector will not have to pay a speeding ticket. If one of its
customers receives a speeding ticket resulting from police radar, American Antenna has prom-
ised to reimburse the owner for the amount of the ticket. See Castro, supra note I at 46.
9. Nor does this article discuss the liability of manufacturers or sellers of defective prod-
ucts. For an analysis of the similarities and differences between defective and criminal prod-
ucts, see infra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
10. With respect to Saturday Night Special handguns, see Kelley, 304 Md. at 145-46,
497 A.2d at 1153-54 ("[T]hese characteristics [short barrels, light weight, easy concealability,
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bullets, and police radar detectors are all examples of criminal prod-
ucts.11 Current legal principles and theories are insufficient to deal
effectively and efficiently with the growing incidents of preventable
pain, injury, and destruction caused by these products. 12 The prob-
lem is that the present legal system has insulated criminal product
manufacturers from bearing the cost of their products by effectively
subsidizing the cost of production with human pain and suffering.
This prevents the operation of free market forces with respect to
criminal products.18 This Article proposes a solution to the criminal
product problem and discusses its background, the application of the
proposed solution, and the relevant policy considerations.
II. Proposed Solution
In order to solve the problem posed by criminal products there
must be an expansion of the tort principles concerning the liability of
product manufacturers." ' The subsidy of human pain and suffering
that allows for the production of these products must be stopped.
The manufacturers of criminal products must be required to bear
the cost of their products. Only by allowing the people maimed and
injured by criminal products to seek the relief they deserve will the
market itself be freed - unfettered from the greed of an organized
minority' 5 - to perform its supreme function of democratic resource
low cost, use of cheap quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliabilityl
render the Saturday Night Special particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually useless
for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, sport, protection of persons, property and busi-
nesses."). Id. With respect to radar detectors, a major producer admits that customers use his
product to break the law. See Rogers, supra note I. Indeed, the author submits that there is no
use other than illegal activity for which the product is suitable.
1I. See supra note 8.
12. See infra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
13. Until manufacturers of criminal products are required to bear the foreseeable cost of
the harm resulting from the intended use of their products, the retail price of such products
will be artificially low. As a result, consumers' decisions to purchase such products are based
on incorrect information. The result is that the production of criminal products is being
secretly subsidized by human pain and suffering. This prevents a demonstration of whether the
production of criminal products is socially useful. If the product does not survive in the mar-
ketplace at the higher price (one that reflects the cost of harm caused by the product) then the
conduct of producing criminal products is not socially useful. See generally W. PROSSER AND
P. KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 85 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Traditional products liability theories are not useful in solving the criminal product
problem. See infra notes 15-38 and accompanying text.
15. An organized minority represented by organizations such as The National Rifle As-
sociation has been and will likely continue to be effective in preventing legislation which would
deal effectively with Saturday Night Specials. One author has noted that "even assuming the
existence of a consensus in favor of such legislation, opponents have proven to be effective in
blocking passage by lobbying." Common Law Approach, supra note 10, at n. 56. "No lobby is
stronger than the gun lobby in its commitment to sacrifice 22,000 American lives a year for a
'mythical' right and illusory purpose." Turley and Harrison, supra note 8, at 309. With respect
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allocation.
To accomplish this end, the courts of this country should adopt
a new rule of law. This rule would, in effect, be a companion to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.16 The following
is a suggested prototype of such a rule:
1. One who sells any product that is likely to be principally
used in illegal activity and which has an insignificant legitimate
use in today's society is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by such product or by a third party's use of such product
to any person or to his property if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product;
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold;
(c) the injury occurs at a time when the product is
being use in illegal activity; and
(d) the person injured was not a participant in the
illegal activity.
2. The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although:
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product;
(b) the person injured has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller; and
(c) the product has been manufactured in accor-
dance with design specifications and has not
malfunctioned.
III. Background
Courts have been faced with the problem of criminal products
for sometime.1 7 With the exception of the Kelley 6 case, however,
to radar detectors, they are illegal in only Connecticut, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
Rogers, supra note 1.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Courts are not only the proper
institution to adopt the proposed rule, they are the only institution that is likely to do so. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text. The goal of the imposition of tort liability upon crimi-
nal product manufacturers is to compensate those injured by the products and to allow the
proper functioning of the free market; it is not to directly prohibit the production of such
products by governmental fiat. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
17. Most cases have concerned Saturday Night Specials. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington
& Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984), Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F.
Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (rejected defective design claim), Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574
F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983); Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La.
1983); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1987
courts have not effectively dealt with the problem. 19 With the excep-
tion of the rule adopted in Kelley,20 none of the recognized principles
of strict liability of product manufacturers can be properly applied to
hold the manufacturers or marketers of criminal products liable to a
person injured by the use of such products in illegal activity." The
principles of tort law relating to the liability of product manufactur-
ers are inadequate to deal with the criminal products problem.
There is a fundamental difference between the problem posed
by criminal products and the problem associated with products to
which a section 402A type of analysis applies. Section 402A is
designed to protect consumers or users of products from injury due
to malfunctioning products. 2 Manufacturers of criminal products,
however, should incur liability not because their products malfunc-
tion but rather, because of their products function .2  This difference,
(1985) (no liability where product operated precisely as designed); Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-
0549 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1982).
18. Kelley, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143.
19. As one commentator noted: "[N]o court to date has determined that the likelihood
of criminal handgun misuse resulting from a manufacturer's unreasonable product design and
marketing may, in some circumstances, provide a basis in negligence and strict products liabil-
ity for finding a breach of its common-law duty to provide reasonably safe products." Common
Law Approach, supra note 8, at 773.
20. For a discussion of the rule, see infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
21. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 132, 497 A.2d at 1146 ("For the following reasons, however,
neither of these two doctrines, [strict liability in tort and strict product liability under section
402A] nor any of the other previously recognized strict liability principles, could properly be
applied to hold, in general, the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun liable to a person
injured by the handgun during the course of a crime."). Id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) requires that the product be in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. ... In order to fulfill
the requirement of a defective condition, it has generally been required that there be some-
thing wrong with the product or that it has in someway malfunctioned. "For the handgun to be
defective, there would have to be a problem in its manufacture or design, such as a weak or
improperly placed part, that would cause it to fire unexpectedly or otherwise malfunction."
Kelley, 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148. "Therefore, the risk-utility test cannot be extended
to impose liability on the maker or marketer of a handgun which has not malfunctioned." Id.
304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 149. "[The] size and concealability of the defendant's handguns
were not conditions which caused the handgun to fail to perform in the manner reasonably to
be expected in light of its nature and intended function." Riordan v. International Armament
Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 at 1298 (1985); "[11n most jurisdictions, a well-
made handgun cannot form the basis for a strict liability claim because the weapon does not
contain dangers uncontemplated by the ordinary consumer." Well-Made Handgun, supra note
7 at 481; "[Plroducts liability doctrine seems to demand, as a threshold matter, that there be
'something wrong' with a product before risk-utility analysis may be applied." Note, Hand-
guns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1915 [hereinafter Handguns].
23. The risk of injury from criminal products is not to the user or consumer of the
product, rather it is to the general public. Moreover, this risk of danger results from the in-
tended use (illegal use) of the product and the proper functioning of the product during such
use. For example, the risk of injury from a Saturday Night Special is borne by the store clerk
or other member of the public that is the victim of the crime, not the criminal user himself,
and that risk results from the product's intended use (illegal use) and proper functioning, as in
discharging a bullet with deadly force in the direction in which the gun is aimed when the
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has rendered section 402A useless in dealing with the problem
caused by criminal products.2 4 Under current product liability analy-
sis, a plaintiff cannot hold a manufacturer liable for injuries caused
by a product unless the plaintiff can show that the product is defec-
tive." Because criminal products are not defective, as such term is
defined in product liability analysis, manufacturers are not presently
liable under a section 402A type of analysis.
Commentators and courts have recognized three types of defects
that may make a product defective under section 402A; manufactur-
ing, design, and defects resulting from the manufacturer's failure to
give adequate warning.26 The only type of defect that is relevant
with respect to criminal products is a design defect. 27 The allegation
is not that the individual product involved was produced or manufac-
tured incorrectly; rather, the allegation is that the design itself is
defective.2 8 There are two generally accepted tests used to determine
if a product was designed defectively; the consumer expectations test
and the risk utility test.2 9 Neither of these tests, however, has proven
effective with respect to criminal products.30
trigger is pulled. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
25. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 148; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (I) comment g (1965); W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS § 98 (1971); W. KIMBLE
& R. LESHER. PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1, at 2 (1979); Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product
Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325, (1971); See generally Traynor, The Ways and Mean-
ings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
26. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3.03[21 (1986); Wade, A
Conspectus of Manufacturers' Liability for Products, 10 IND. L. REV. 755, 756-57 (1977); W.
PROSSER AND P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 99, at 695.
27. See Common Law Approach, supra note 8, at 790; Handguns, supra note 22, at
1912-13. Well-Made Handgun, supra note 7; at 482.
28. See W. PROSSER AND P. KEETON supra note 13 § 99, at 694, 698; see, e.g., Self v.
General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1974). Self involved a
Ford Pinto automobile that was found to be defective due to the design which placed its gaso-
line tank near the rear bumper. The court held that the placement of the tank in the center of
the car would have reduced the chances of fire in rear-end collisions without creating other
risks, significantly reducing performance, or significantly increasing costs. Thus, under the
risk-utility test the design was defective because the risk associated with the placement of the
gasoline tank in the rear outweighed its utility. Id.
29. See generally Traynor, supra note 27, at 363, 370; Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L. J. 825, 837-38 (1973). Professor Wade suggests seven fac-
tors to be examined in applying the risk-utility test: I) utility of the product; 2) likelihood and
seriousness of potential injury; 3) availability of a substitute; 4) ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without undue expense or destroying the product's usefulness; 5)
user's ability to avoid danger; 6) user's anticipated awareness of danger; and 7) feasibility of
the manufacturer spreading the risk of loss. See also L. FRUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 26; W. PROSSER AND P. KEETON, supra note 13 § 99, at 694, 698-702.
30. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 149. In Kelley, the court stated: "In sum,
regardless of the standard used [consumer expectation or risk-utility] to determine whether a
product is 'defective' under Sec. 402A, a handgun which functions as intended and as expected
is not 'defective' within the meaning of that section. This has been the consistent conclusion in
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Criminal products will not be considered defective under the
consumer expectations test because consumers expect such products
to be useful in dangerous illegal activity. 1 Products are considered
defective under the consumer expectations test if the product, at the
time it leaves the seller's hands, is in a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer which will render the product unreasona-
bly dangerous to him.82 The consumer of criminal products expects
them to be useful in dangerous illegal activity. Indeed, the typical
consumer of such a product is purchasing the product precisely be-
cause it is useful in illegal activity.33 Consumer expectations analysis
is focused on the ultimate user or consumer3 4 and will not permit the
focus of the inquiry to shift to the general public.85 In the case of
other jurisdictions which have confronted the issue." See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington and Rich-
ardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp.
1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Richman v. Charter Arms Co., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds; sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir.
1985); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 III. App.3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293
(1985); Francis v. Diamond International Corp. Nos. CV 82-11-1279 and CV 83-02-0215 (Ct.
of Com. Pl., Butler County, Ohio, March 22, 1983), appeal noted, No. CA-84-09-1 11, Ohio
App. See also Well-Made Handgun, supra note 7; Santavelli and Calio, Turning the Gun on
Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L. J. 471
(1983); Handguns, supra note 25. But see Turley and Harrison, supra note 2; Common Law
Approach, supra note 8.
31. It is ridiculous to ask whether the purchaser of a radar detector is aware that the
product may increase his likelihood of speeding and thereby present a danger to the general
public. Obviously, if the purchaser felt comfortable speeding without the assistance of the
detector, or if he did not want to speed, he would not purchase the detector. He purchases the
radar detector so that he can speed with a reduced risk of being apprehended through the use
of police radar.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
33. For example, the purchaser of a Saturday Night Special handgun is obviously aware
of the risk associated with the gun's use in illegal activity. Indeed, the intention to use the
Saturday Night Special in illegal activity is the only logical reason for him to purchase the
handgun.
34. Even though the drafters of the Restatement expressed no opinion as to section
402A's applicability to bystanders, some courts have found section 402A to be applicable to
bystanders. See generally, Common Law Approach, supra note 10 at n. 61 and cases cited
therein. None of the bystander cases, however, arose under a "criminal product" theory. By-
stander cases are fundamentally similar to other section 402A cases in that they are concerned
with injury to the user, consumer and, in the case of bystanders, those nearby. But this is
merely a recognition of the fact that a defective product's scope of injury can extend beyond
the user. This is not the same as recognizing a risk to the public that is different than the risk
to the user or consumer. Thus, such cases are not helpful in dealing with criminal products
that encourage illegal activity and thereby present a risk of injury to the public. See infra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
35. Products that fail to function as intended present a risk of injury to the public in
that any member of the public is a potential user or consumer (or perhaps a bystander in a
situation where the scope of the injury spreads beyond the user or consumer). Thus, by al-
lowing users and consumers to recover, the public is protected from the risk associated with
defective products. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text. Criminal products, however,
pose a risk of injury to the public as opposed to the user or consumer. Those at risk include
everyone other than the user or consumer. Thus, a rule that protects injured users or consum-
ers is not adequate to protect the public from the risk associated with criminal products.
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criminal products, however, it is the public, not the consumer, which
bears the risk of injury created by the products.3
Nor will criminal products be found to be defective under the
risk utility test."7 Many courts have held that the risk utility test can
only be applied when something goes wrong with the product, as
when the product malfunctions.38 For example, many courts will not
consider applying the risk utility test until a threshold requirement
that "there is something wrong with the product" has been met. 9 In
other words, in order for the risk-utility test to be applied, the plain-
tiff must show that the product failed to perform in the reasonably
expected manner.' ° Thus, unless the product has malfunctioned, the
test is inapplicable. Criminal products, when used in illegal activity,
36. If one were to logically apply section 402A to criminal products, the inquiry would
have to be: Are criminal products in a condition unexpected by the public which makes them
more dangerous to the public than the public expects? Even focused in this way, criminal
products still would not be deemed defective unless the analysis were changed. That is, expec-
tations under a section 402A analysis are met if the product functions as expected. Such an
inquiry with respect to criminal products is irrelevant. The relevant analysis for criminal prod-
ucts focuses on expectations concerning use, not function. The problem with criminal products
is not their function, it is that they are designed to function in the context of illegal activity.
Any firearm propels a bullet with deadly force; that does not make it a criminal product. It
becomes a criminal product when it is designed so that its primary use is for illegal activity.
See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. If the analysis under section 402A could be
changed in this way, then it becomes obvious that such products would be defective. The pub-
lic does not expect, for example, a type of handgun to be designed so that its primary use is for
illegal activity. In short, the public does not expect any product to be designed so that its
primary use is in illegal activity. Nor does the public expect businessmen to profit from prod-
ucts that they know are used principally in crime. There is no merit in running a business well
if the product produced is of no use to, and indeed harms, society.
Section 402A is capable of effectively protecting consumers and users from defective
products but it can not be extended, nor should it be extended, to deal with criminal products.
The problems posed by the two types of products are fundamentally different. See supra notes
22-35 and accompanying text. If section 402A was stretched to apply to criminal products,
inconsistencies would develop that could threaten not only section 402A's effective use for
criminal products but its use for defective products as well.
37. Under the risk utility test, a product is defective if on balance the benefits of the
challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. See Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978).
38. See Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985). In Pat-
terson, plaintiff's decedent died from gunshot wounds inflicted by a .38 caliber Rohm during
the commission of a crime. The plaintiff argued that the gun's manufacturer was strictly liable
under section 402A. Rejecting the "defective design" claim, the court stated that "a gun, by
its very nature, must be dangerous and must have the capacity to discharge a bullet with
deadly force." Id. at 1212. See, e.g., Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 III.
App.3d at 650, 477 N.E.2d at 1298. In Riordan, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that a handgun was defectively designed because it was small and easily concealable. The
court stated: "[The] size and concealability of the defendants' handguns were not conditions
which caused the handgun to fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light
of its nature and intended function." Id. The court held that a handgun could not be deemed
to be defective "where the plaintiff's injury was caused by that product's operation precisely as
it was designed to operate." Id. See also Handguns, supra note 27, at 1915-17 and nn. 19-26.
39. See Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
40. Id.
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are not malfunctioning; instead they are functioning precisely as in-
tended and expected." This illustrates the fundamental difference
between the problem posed by criminal products and that posed by
products to which traditional product liability analysis applies. In the
later case, the manufacturer of such a product is liable for the mal-
functioning of his products, while in the former, the manufacturer
should be liable because of the product's function. Thus, criminal
products are not defective under either the consumer expectations
test or the risk utility test. This is the reason that traditional strict
products liability analysis has not and will not be effective in solving
the problem created by criminal products.
A Saturday Night Special handgun, an example of one of the
most destructive criminal products, was the focal point of Kelley v.
R.G. Industries.42 In Kelley, the plaintiff, Olen J. Kelley, was shot in
41. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149; Castro, supra note I ("Many of the
motorists [taking trips in summer 86] are bound to indulge in a familiar American Pastime:
avoiding speed traps . . . . Indeed, U.S. drivers in ever increasing numbers are turning for
help in that unsporting effort to one of the hottest of automobile accessories, the miniature
radar detector.") The chairman of a major producer or radar detectors admits that customers
use his product to break the law. Rogers, supra note I.
42. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). Procedurally, Kel-
ley began in the circuit court for Montgomery County, Maryland. One of the defendants, R.G.
Industries, had the case removed to the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1441 and 1446. A motion was made to have the case
dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court found that there were no controlling precedents in the Maryland
Court of Appeals and certified certain questions to the Maryland Court of Appeals. During
oral argument, matters were raised that were not specifically addressed in the certification
order. The plaintiffs requested that the order be withdrawn and that a new order be filed.
Pursuant to the request, the district court withdrew the original order and substituted a "Fur-
ther Order of Certification" containing the following questions:
Question I
Is a handgun, which inflicts injury as the norm, rather than the exception, a
defective or unreasonably dangerous product?
If the answer to Question I is "No," then
Question 2
Is a Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S, which inflicts injury as the
norm, rather than the exception, a defective or unreasonably dangerous product?
Question 3
Is the marketing of handguns an abnormally dangerous activity? In answer-
ing this question, it may be that the Court of Appeals of Maryland may desire
to address itself to the following sub-questions:
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to in-
stances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where
harm is brought about by some third person or persons over whom the
tortfeasor had no control?
If the answer to Question 3 is "No," then
Question 4
Is the marketing of Rohm Revolver Handguns Model RG38S an abnor-
mally dangerous activity? In answering this question, it may be that the Court
of Appeals of Maryland may desire to address itself to the following
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the chest during an armed robbery of the grocery store where he was
employed.'" The gun used in the crime was a Rohm Revolver Hand-
gun Model RG-38S designed and marketed by Rohm Gesellschaft, a
West German corporation."
The court in Kelley found, inter alia, that "regardless of the
standard used to determine whether a product is 'defective' under
section 402A, a handgun which functions as intended and as ex-
pected is not 'defective' within the meaning of that section."4 ' The
court went on to note that "this has been the consistent conclusion in
other jurisdictions which have confronted the issue."
' 6
The court recognized, however, that the problem of criminal
products must be solved and, moreover, that the courts have the
power, indeed the duty, to solve the problem.4' The court stated that
the fact that heretofore a handgun's classification as a Saturday
Night Special did not necessarily bring its manufacturer or marketer
subquestions:
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to in-
stances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where
harm is brought about by some third person or persons over whom the
tortfeasor had no control?
304 Md. at 29-31, 497 A.2d at 1145-46. The court noted that the Further Order of Certifica-
tion provided that the court was not restricted in its consideration and determination of the
matter by the phrasing of the certified question. The court rephrased the questions as follows:
I) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun, in general, liable under
any strict liability theory to a person injured as a result of the criminal use of its
product?
2) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a particular category of small, cheap
handguns, sometimes referred to as "Saturday Night Specials," and regularly
used in criminal activity, strictly liable to a person injured by such handgun
during the course of a crime?
3) Does the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S, serial number
0152662, fall within the category referred to in question 2?
Id.
43. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149. See supra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
46. Id.
47. In Kelley the court stated:
[ . . ITihe common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism -
its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just and
fair solutions to pressing societal problems . . . . The common law is, therefore,
subject to judicial modification in light of modern circumstances or increased
knowledge. Indeed, we have not hesitated to change the common law to permit
new actions or remedies where we have concluded that such course was justified
.... It is entirely consistent with public policy to hold the manufacturers and
marketers of Saturday Night Special handguns strictly liable to innocent persons
who suffer gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products . . . . Fur-
thermore, in light of the ever growing number of deaths and injuries due to such
handguns being used in criminal activity, the imposition of such liability is war-
ranted by today's circumstances.
Id. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51 (footnotes omitted).
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within any of the previously existing theories of strict liability was
not dispositive of the case.48 Noting that the common law adapts to
fit the needs of society,4 9 the court held the manufacturers and mar-
keters of Saturday Night Special handguns strictly liable to innocent
persons not involved in the crime who suffer gunshot injuries from
the criminal use of such products. 50
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the fact that
Congress as well as the Maryland General Assembly had enacted a
comprehensive regulatory scheme concerning the wearing, carrying
and transporting of handguns. 1 The court found, however, that Sat-
urday Night Specials clearly are not sanctioned as a matter of state
or federal public policy. 52 While no clear cut definition of a Saturday
Night Special exists the court noted these guns are generally charac-
terized by: short barrels, light weight, easy concealability, low cost,
use of low quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and un-
reliability.58 The court stated that such characteristics render the
Saturday Night Special particularly attractive for criminal use and
virtually useless for any legitimate purpose.54 In addition, the court
found that "the manufacturers or marketers of a Saturday Night
Special know or ought to know that they are making or selling a
product principally to be used in criminal activity."55 The court also
noted that "as between the manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday
Night Special, who places among the public a product that will be
used chiefly in criminal activity, and the innocent victim of such mis-
use, the former is certainly more at fault than the latter."58
The manufacturer or marketer of criminal products knows, or
should know, that his product will be used in illegal activity. 57 Illegal
activity is objectively the intended use of the product.5 8 The law
should no longer permit the manufacturer or marketer to shut his
eyes to the obvious, to hide behind his profit and loss statement with
the claim - "I just make or sell the product; I do not tell the buyer
what to do with it." When illegal use and harm is virtually all that
can be foreseen or expected from the product's intended use, the
48. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1150-52.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1160.
51. Id. at 142-57, nn. 5-17, 497 A.2d at 1151-58.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
54. Id. at 146, 497 A.2d at 1154.
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manufacturer and marketer must be made liable for that harm when
in fact it occurs.
The holding of the Kelley case is limited to Saturday Night
Specials" but its logic is applicable to the entire class of criminal
products. The holding of Kelley needs to be restated in general terms
and adopted by courts across the country. 0 The adoption of a rule
similar to the one proposed will allow the great light of justice to
shine upon the mercenary manufacturers and marketers of criminal
products and reveal the responsibility they bear for the preventable
pain and suffering foreseeably caused by their products.
IV. Application of the Proposed Rule
The proposed rule and section 402A are similar in a number of
ways. Both rules impose strict liability and focus directly on the
product rather than the manufacturer or marketer. Moreover, both
serve the same basic purpose of protecting the public from dangerous
products. As mentioned above, however, the risk of danger and its
relation to the product is fundamentally different with respect to
criminal products than for products to which section 402A can be
applied.6' This fundamental difference is illustrated by the fact that
the proposed rule only applies to products that are "likely to be prin-
cipally used in illegal activity and which have an insignificant legiti-
mate use in today's society."62 The requirement of "principal use"
may be established by statistics referring to the actual use of the
product,63 or the "likely principal use" may be inferred from the
characteristics of the product.6 The phrase "illegal activity" is used
to include not only activity that is criminal but also any activity that
violates the law. The seriousness of the illegal use as determined by
the potential for and severity of the injuries likely to result from it,
however, should affect the analysis.60 In order for the rule to apply to
a product, such product must have an insignificant "legitimate use in
59. See id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1160.
60. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
63. See e.g., Kelley, 304 Md. at 145, 497 A.2d at 1153. "Support is also found in statis-
tical studies of handguns used in crime confiscated by police in major urban centers. One such
study showed that 69 percent of handguns used in homicides, and 75 percent of handguns
seized that were used in assaults were the small 'crime-related handgun' with barrel lengths of
less than three inches." Id. (citations omitted).
64. A product's physical characteristics may imply its intended usage. See e.g., supra
note 12.
65. All things being equal, the more severe the likely injury from the product's illegal
use, the more likely the product is to be characterized as a criminal product.
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today's society." 66 The existence of any legitimate use for the prod-
uct will not prevent the application of the rule. Moreover, the signifi-
cance of a legitimate use would depend both upon whether such use
is actually made of the product as opposed to merely a possible use,'
7
and whether substitute products are available with respect to the le-
gitimate uses of the alleged criminal product. It is also relevant
whether the features that allow for the legitimate use can be re-
tained if those that make it a criminal product are removed. If so,
then the rule should apply to the product. In addition the reference
to "today's society" is intended to allow the rule to keep pace with a
changing society.
The cause requirement of the proposed rule is similar to section
402A's cause requirement. That is, cause-in-fact and proximate
cause will both be elements of the cause of action. Proximate cause,
however, should rarely be in question once the product is found to be
a criminal product because foreseeability on the part of the product
seller can be inferred once the product is so characterized. 8 The is-
sue of intervening, supervening cause based on a third party's illegal
use of the product should likewise rarely create an issue because the
proposed rule specifically subjects the product seller to liability for
injuries resulting from a third party's illegal use of the product. This
provision is made in the rule to avoid possible confusion, but it
merely reflects current law.69 It has long been established that fore-
seeable intervening forces will not supersede defendant's responsibil-
ity, where the defendant's conduct has increased the risk of harm
from the intervening cause.70 For example, the sale of a radar detec-
66. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
67. For example, if the producers of radar detectors were to argue that their products
are designed for use by individuals desiring to ensure they are not being followed by someone
using radar, such argument would be insufficient, in light of the product's actual use, to pre-
vent the product's classification as a criminal product.
68. Before the proposed rule will be applied to a specific product, it requires that the
product "is likely to be principally used in illegal activity" and have "an insignificant legiti-
mate use in today's society." See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
69. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort is a superseding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom although the actor's negligent con-
duct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to
commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent con-
duct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might
be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to
commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (emphasis added). Although section 448
reflects legal principles applicable to those whose conduct indicates negligence, the author be-
lieves such principles, as they relate to causation, can be properly applied in the products
liability and criminal product context. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 44.
70. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 44, 272-73.
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tor increases the likelihood that purchasers of the product will ex-
ceed the speed limit. Thus, because the intervening cause - the con-
sumers decision to exceed the speed limit - is foreseeable to the
product seller and the sale of the product increases the risk of speed-
ing, such intervening cause will not be characterized as a supersed-
ing intervening cause.
71
The cause-in-fact requirement will usually present a question
for the jury.72 The argument to establish cause-in-fact is simply that,
but for the existence of the product, the injury actually suffered
would not have occurred as it did."
Like section 402A, the proposed rule only applies to sellers en-
gaged in the business of selling such products, and it does not apply
to sellers who sold the product prior to a change being made in the
product by a subsequent seller. 4 Changes made by the consumer,
however, would not allow sellers to use the protection provided by
this provision. In order to be consistent with respect to the problem
presented by criminal products, the rule does not apply unless the
product is being used in illegal activity. 75 Moreover, the rule will not
apply in cases where the plaintiff was a participant in the illegal
activity.70 As in section 402A, privity of contract between plaintiff
and defendant is not required by the proposed rule." In addition,
because of the nature of the problem associated with criminal prod-
ucts, it is specifically provided that the fact that the product was
manufactured in accordance with design specifications and has not
malfunctioned will not prevent liability under the proposed rule.78
The problem with criminal products is not that they malfunction
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
72. See W. PROSSER, supra note 25 § 41, at 236.
73. Id.; See also Handguns, supra note 24, at 1919 n.39.
Under the less stringent cause-in-fact standard, however, the plaintiff would
be able to recover despite the possibility that the person who injured him could
have carried out the crime even if the handgun manufactured by the defendant
had not been available. The argument for causation would be simply that, but
for the existence of the handgun and its capacity to cause harm, the injury actu-
ally suffered by the plaintiff would not have occurred as it did.
Obviously, in appropriate circumstances one could rely on the significant factor test as well as
the rest of the law of causation as it has developed with respect to negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
75. Id.
76. Id. This is in recognition of the type of risk created by criminal products. See infra
notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
78. Id. This is in recognition of the fact that the problem associated with criminal prod-
ucts is not that they malfunction - it is precisely that they function as designed and that they
are designed for illegal use. See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
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it is that they function precisely as designed.
V. Policy Considerations
One may argue that under our economic system, the free mar-
ket should determine what products will be produced and that the
proposed rule in effect dictates that certain products will not be pro-
duced. The proposed rule, however, does not directly ban any prod-
uct.79 Rather, it requires that the foreseeable cost to society that is
associated with criminal products be borne by those who are respon-
sible for and profit from the illegal use of such products. If the prod-
ucts are no longer produced after the rule is adopted then it is simply
because society has decided that the price of such products, when
such price has been brought to their attention, is too high when com-
pared with the utility of the product. 80 In that case, the use of re-
sources to produce such products is improper.
In addition, it may be argued that courts should refrain from
adopting the rule called for by this author; this argument would ad-
vocate that such a rule must be adopted by the legislature. Section
402A, however, was adopted by the courts, not the legislature."
Fundamentally, courts must serve justice. Most often courts achieve
this goal by applying law. When justice demands, however, the
courts have and must continue to heed the call and formulate the
rules necessary for a just society. 82 The mere fact that liability has
not heretofore been recognized has not and should not stop its recog-
nition when such recognition is demanded by the principles of
justice.83
The blatant injustice associated with criminal products is clear.
In essence the product manufacturer and seller are accomplices to
the illegal activity for which their products are used. Clearly, the
manufacturer and marketer knowingly aid the commission of the il-
legal act.8 ' Their fault should not go unrecognized merely because
79. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 13 § 85, at 610; See Common Law Approach, supra
note 8, at 799.
80. See supra note 79.
8 1. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
82. See Kelley, 304 Md. at 140-42, 794 A.2d at 1150-51. See e.g., Greeman v. Yuba
Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916).
83. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
84. The manufacturers and sellers of criminal products know that their products will be
used primarily in criminal activity, yet they continue to produce and sell them. See Kelley, 304
Md. at 137, 497 A.2d at 1158. ("Saturday Night Specials are largely unfit for any of the
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they did not actually carry out the illegal act. The law does not allow
so inconsequent a distinction. The concept of vicarious liability is ap-
plied throughout the law to deal with such situations." The fault of
the perpetrator is not to be excused by the fault of the manufacturer
or seller. Rather, they are all at fault, although the perpetrator's
degree of fault is much greater than the product manufacturer or
seller. Thus, the manufacturer and seller of criminal products should
bear civil responsibility for the foreseeable and preventable harm
which their criminal products cause.86
It is often said that fairness requires that one who is made to
pay for the harm suffered by another should in some way be at fault
with respect to the occurrence of the harm. 7 The concept of fault,
however, has continued to evolve and is no longer limited to a con-
cept of personal moral blame. 88 As Dean Prosser notes: "in the legal
sense, 'fault' has come to mean no more than a departure from the
conduct required of a man by society for the protection of others,
and it is the public and social interest which determines what is re-
quired."8 9 Thus, for example, even though section 402A provides for
strict liability, this is more a matter of proof than the imposition of
liability without fault.90 As discussed earlier, 402A requires that the
product be defective before liability is imposed. 9' Under section
402A, there is no requirement that the plaintiff prove that the de-
fendant was negligent with respect to the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff but the fact that such fault need not be proved does not
mean that it does not exist. Someone other than the consumer de-
signs and produces the product and products do not become defective
recognized legitimate uses . . . the chief value a Saturday Night Special Handgun has is in
criminal activity...") Id. With respect to radar detectors the Chairman of a leading manu-
facturer of the devices, when questioned about the use of his product to break the law stated
"Everybody knows why people buy radar detectors. ... Indeed, as with other criminal
products, I submit there is no use for radar detectors other than to break the law. See also
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
85. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 13 § 69, at 499. The policy arguments
stated by Prosser and Keeton in support of strict liability - accident prevention, enterprise
risk-shifting capacity, and difficulties of proving negligence - are applicable with respect to
criminal products.
86. See infra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
87. See W, PROSSER, supra note 25, § 4, 17-18, n.32.
88. Id. at 18.
89. Id.
90. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
LAW REV. 791 (1966), at 840-48 "When the plaintiff has proved this much, [referring to the
elements that the plaintiff must establish under Section 402A] all trial lawyers know that he
usually recovers in a negligence action against the manufacturer . . . . The alarm of the man-
ufacturers over the prospect of a great increase in liability under the new rule [402A] is not in
reality justified." Id. (footnotes omitted).
91. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
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on their own.92
Similarly, with respect to criminal products, liability is not im-
posed without fault; rather, like section 402A, proof of fault is not
required. As in a section 402A analysis, the focus is on the product,
not the manufacturer." Moreover, once a product has been classified
as a criminal product, the inference of fault on the part of the sellers
of the product with respect to injuries caused by the product's use in
illegal activity reasonably follows.'
Another important policy consideration, perhaps the most im-
portant, is public safety and the right of individuals injured by crimi-
nal products to recover for their injuries. In our society, tort law has
been the principal champion of public safety.a5 The United States
tort system developed over hundreds of years and countless decisions.
It has been the main avenue available to victims in their quest for
compensatory justice. The tort system has allowed our country to
stand without equal in its civilized recognition of the individual's
right to safety - in the workplace, the environment, and with re-
spect to products. 6 It has provided for the generation of the deter-
rence consequences that result from a successful settlement award or
appellate decision, and it provides an incentive to manufacturers and
sellers to engage in safer and more healthful practice in the future.'
7
Everyone has benefitted from the deterrence function served by tort
law even if they are fortunate enough to have never been injured by,
for example, an unsafe product. The products used everyday are
safer because of the lawsuits, appellate court opinions and judgments
of the past." Tort laws and principles have been the driving force in
this society's steady course from a shameless disregard of individual
physical integrity toward respect for human dignity, and a recogni-
tion that human safety cannot be sacrificed for profit. 9 Thus, it is
92. See supra note 90. One reason negligence need not be proved is because today's
products and marketing structure make it too difficult to prove. Once it has been established
that the product is defective, however, the inference of negligence or fault can reasonably be
made. Id. See generally Kelley, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143. W. PROSSER AND P. KEETON,
supra note 13, § 98, at 693.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
94. See supra note 90.
95. From a transcript of remarks of Ralph Nadar made at the Philadelphia Bar Associ-
ation Quarterly Meeting and Luncheon, June 18, 1986, Philadelphia Centre Hotel, Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, page 5 (a copy of the transcript is available from the Philadelphia Bar
Association, One Reading Center, Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 238-6300) (hereinafter "Re-
marks of Ralph Nadar").
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 4; see generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 15, § 98, at 692-93.
98. See W. PROSSER AND P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 98, at 693.
99. See Remarks of Ralph Nadar, supra note 95, at 5.
PRODUCTS DESIGNED FOR ILLEGAL USE
appropriate to look to tort law to provide protection from criminal
products. The proposed rule will serve this function because it places
liability openly on the party who is in the best position to solve the
problem.100 It also provides an effective means by which those in-
jured by criminal products can recover compensation for their inju-
ries. Moreover, if the product continues to be produced, the cost of
such recovery will be equitably distributed among those who use the
product.101
Another important policy, respect for the law, will also be
served by the proposed rule. Criminal products and the advertising
that accompanies them, send a distinct message to the public that
the law can be disobeyed without consequence. For example, the ad-
vertisements for radar detection devices create the impression that
speeding is a game; it is not wrong as long as one is not caught.1
02
The public may well reason "if the prohibition against speeding were
serious, why is it that businesses are permitted to profit from encour-
aging people, even providing them with the means, to speed?" More-
over, under current law the manufacturers and retailers of radar de-
tection devices do not have to pay for the foreseeable injuries that
result from their conduct. The message sent by protecting criminal
products is two-fold. First, the law is not to be taken seriously, and
second, profit even at the expense of the law is acceptable. The adop-
tion of the proposed rule will cancel that message and send a new
one to the boardrooms of American business as well as to the general
public, that the law, both letter and spirit, must be respected and
profit at the expense of the law will not be tolerated.
VI. Conclusion
If our legal system cannot protect the victims of criminal prod-
ucts, those persons maimed and injured by products whose primary
use is to cause just such injuries, who can it protect? No one is im-
mune; any member of the American public may be injured by a
criminal product. Should those manufacturers and sellers who bear a
direct responsibility for such injury, those who profit from such inju-
100. See W. PROSSER AND P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 85, at 610.
101. See also id. § 98, at 693.
102. See e.g., Castro, supra note I, (The picture that appears over the article is a photo-
graph, taken from the back seat of a car, that includes the speedometer, a radar detector and a
view of the road. The driver is clearly speeding as evidenced by the speedometer and the
caption reads: "Topping the limit with impunity on the New Jersey Turnpike, thanks to a
handy device.").
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ries, go unaccountable? Justice cries out, logic takes flight, and hope
is numbed at such a result.
